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The Paradox of Idealisation 
 
SALVATORE FLORIO & JULIEN MURZI 
 
A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, shows 
that all truths are knowable only if all truths are known.
1
 This is the Paradox of 
Knowability. If we take it, quite plausibly, that we are not omniscient, the proof appears 
to undermine metaphysical doctrines committed to the knowability of truth, such as 
semantic anti-realism. Since its rediscovery by W. D. Hart and Colin McGinn (1976), 
many solutions to the paradox have been offered. In this paper, we present a new proof to 
the effect that not all truths are knowable, which rests on different assumptions from 
those of the original argument published by Fitch. We highlight the general form of the 
knowability paradoxes, and argue that anti-realists who favour either a hierarchical or an 
intuitionistic approach to the Paradox of Knowability are confronted with a dilemma: 
they must either give up anti-realism or opt for a highly controversial interpretation of the 
principle that every truth is knowable.  
 
1. The Church-Fitch Paradox  
 
The proof of the Church-Fitch Paradox requires only that knowledge be factive and that it 
distribute over conjunction. Let ‘!’ and ‘!’ denote some notion of possibility and some 
correlative notion of necessity respectively. Then, one can prove that what Williamson 
(2000) calls weak verificationism:  
 
 (WVER) "!(! # !K!), 
 
collapses into strong verificationism:  
 
 (SVER) "!(! # K!),2 
 
where K! reads ‘someone knows at some time that !’.3 One first shows that for any 
particular proposition p,  
 
 (1) ¬!K(p & ¬Kp)  
 
is provable. One then proceeds to show that all truths are knowable only if all truths are 
known. In a nutshell, if K is factive and distributes over conjunction, truths of the form ! 
& ¬K! are provably unknowable. Yet on the anti-realist assumption that all truths are 
knowable, unknowable propositions are to be regarded as false. By an elementary, though 
exclusively classical step, it follows that all truths are known. Since this latter claim 
appears to be false – indeed, we are not omniscient – anti-realism is under threat.  
                                                
1
 See Fitch 1963 and Church 2008.  
2
 These principles are usually meant to apply only to propositions expressed by sentences we understand, 
and the quantifiers are interpreted substitutionally. Neither complication affects our points below.  
3
 For the sake of clarity, we shall occasionally make the quantifiers explicit and write $xKx! and "xKx!.  
 2. Intuitionistic and hierarchical treatments  
 
According to Timothy Williamson (1982), the Paradox of Knowability is no 
straightforward reductio of semantic anti-realism. As he points out, within intuitionistic 
logic WVER only implies  
 
 (WVER*) "!(! # ¬¬K!). 
 
But unlike SVER, WVER* is not obviously problematic. As Williamson puts it: ‘it 
forbids intuitionists to produce claimed instances of truths that will never be known: but 
why should they attempt something so foolish?’ (1982: 206). Furthermore, given the 
intuitionistic invalidity of the step from ¬"x! to $x¬!, intuitionists can deny that all 
truths will be known at some time without thereby being committed to the existence of 
any forever unknown truth. The paradox constrains anti-realism, Williamson concludes, 
but does not necessarily undermine it: ‘That a little logic should short circuit an intensely 
difficult and obscure issue was perhaps too much to hope, or fear.’ (1982: 207)
4
 
  A second, quite natural way to block the Paradox had already been suggested  
by Church in 1945:  
 
Of course the foregoing refutation [...] is strongly suggestive of the paradox of the 
liar and other epistemological paradoxes. It may therefore be that Fitch can meet 
this particular objection by incorporating into the system of his paper one of the 
standard devices for avoiding the epistemological paradoxes. (Church 2008)  
 
Bernard Linsky (2008) and Alexander Paseau (2008) have recently developed this 
thought. Though the Church-Fitch proof makes no use of self-referential sentences, they 
observe, it is nevertheless invalid on a logical account of knowledge reminiscent of 
Russell’s theory of types. The intuitive idea is that each formula is assigned a logical 
type, which reflects the nesting of occurrences of K within that formula. Formally, one 
introduces infinitely many knowledge operators Kn, one for each natural number n. The 
type of any formula ! is defined by the greatest index of the knowledge operators 
occurring in !. A formula of the form Kn! is well-formed just in case n is strictly greater 
                                                
4
 In a recent response to the Paradox, Michael Dummett endorses an intuitionist strategy similar to the one 
outlined above (2007: 348–50). On Dummett’s view, intuitionists can escape the Paradox as long as they 
can avoid commitment to the existence of forever unknown truths (notice that in light of the Paradox, 
asserting the existence of any such truth is intuitionistically inconsistent with WVER). Dummett claims that 
intuitionists do not incur such a commitment since the Law of Bivalence can only be legitimately applied to 
decidable mathematical statements, and not to empirical statements that we could have known but no 
longer can. He writes: ‘[the realist] relies on assuming bivalence in order to provide an example of a true 
statement that will never be known to be true – more exactly – of a pair of statements one of which is true. 
He has to. If he could instance a specific true statement, he would know that it was true. This illustrates 
how important the principle of bivalence is in the controversy between supporters and opponents of 
realism.’ (2007: 350) Our new paradox circumvents the problem raised by Dummett. The first version of it, 
which we present in §3, implies the existence of forever unknown truths, but we argue that it does so 
consistently with Dummett’s take on the Law of Bivalence. As for the modal version we give in §4, it does 
not imply the existence of forever unknown truths.  
than the type of !. In this framework, only !(Kn+2! & ¬Kn+1!) follows from WVER. But 
unless it is assumed that Kn+1! entails Kn! for every index n and formula !, that is not a 
formal contradiction.  
 Does the hierarchical treatment represent a viable answer to the Church-Fitch 
Paradox? And can a simple appeal to intuitionistic logic salvage semantic anti-realism 
from its paradoxical consequences?  
 
3. The Paradox of Idealisation  
 
There is a dispute among anti-realists over whether or not knowability requires 
idealisation. Strict Finitists think that idealisation is not required: the word ‘knowable’, 
for them, is to be interpreted as ‘possibly known by agents just like us’. Strict Finitism 
has highly revisionary consequences. On that view, any decidable proposition that cannot 
be known for mere ‘medical’ limitations, e.g. some arithmetical propositions involving 
very large numbers, turns out to be meaningless, if not false. But this result is hardly 
acceptable. As Dummett puts it: 
  
The intuitionist sanctions the assertion, for any natural number, however large, that 
it is either prime or composite, since we have a method that will, at least in 
principle, decide the question. But suppose that we do not, and perhaps in practice 
cannot apply that method: is there nevertheless a fact of the matter concerning 
whether the number is prime or not? There is a strong impulse that there must be. 
(1994: 296–97) 
  
Dummett offers an argument against Strict Finitism in his ‘Wang’s Paradox’. He assumes 
the existence of a number m ‘sufficiently large that it is plainly not a member of the 
totality [of apodictic numbers]’ (Dummett 1975: 306), where a number n is apodictic ‘if 
it is possible for a proof (which we are capable of taking in, i.e. of recognizing as such) to 
contain as many as n steps’ (ibid.). Consider now some decidable mathematical 
proposition p whose proof has at least m steps. In Dummett’s view, anti-realists can 
legitimately say that either p or its negation is true: although neither p nor its negation is 
feasibly knowable, at least (and at most) one of them is nevertheless knowable in an 
idealised sense.  
 Following Dummett, most anti-realists concede that ‘knowable’ in WVER is to be 
read as ‘knowable in principle’, i.e. knowable by agents endowed with cognitive 
capacities like ours or that finitely exceed ours.
5
 Here is Neil Tennant:  
 
The truth does not have to be knowable by all and sundry, regardless of their 
competence to judge. [. . . ] This would be to hostage too much of what is true to 
individual misfortune. At the very least, we have to abstract or idealize away from 
the limitations of actual individuals. […] At the very least, then, we have to 
imagine that we can appeal to an ideal cognitive representative of our species. 
(1997: 144) 
  
                                                
5
 See especially (Tennant 1997: chapter 5).  
 
Call such anti-realists moderate. In spite of its initial plausibility, this move runs  
the risk of becoming a Trojan horse.  
 Our argument starts from the moderate anti-realist’s concession that there are 
feasibly unknowable truths, i.e. truths that, because of their complexity or of the 
complexity of their proofs, can only be known by agents whose cognitive capacities 
finitely exceed ours. In symbols:  
 
 (2) $!(! & !"x(Kx! # Ix)),  
 
where ‘Ix’ reads ‘x is an idealised agent’ and an agent counts as idealised if and only if 
her cognitive capacities – perceptual discrimination, memory, working memory etc. – 
finitely exceed ours.
6
 Let q be one such feasibly unknowable truth and let us assume that 
there are no idealised agents:  
 
 (3) ¬$xIx.  
 
It can be proved that the conjunction  
 
 (4) q ! ¬$xIx  
 
is unknowable:  
 
Proof: Assume that q & ¬$xIx is knowable. Then there is a world w where some 
agent knows q & ¬$xIx. Call this agent a. By (2), every agent who knows q in w is 
idealised. Therefore, a is idealised. However, since a knows q & ¬$xIx, by 
distributivity and factivity, q & ¬$xIx is true at w. Hence, a cannot be an idealised 
agent. Contradiction. Therefore, q & ¬$xIx is unknowable.  
 
We call this the Paradox of Idealisation.  
 The argument generalizes. Similar proofs can be constructed for every formula ! 
and P(x, !) such that the following holds:  
 
 (5) $!(! & !"x(Kx! # P(x, !)) & ¬$x P(x, !)).  
 
Relevant instances of P(x, !) may include traditional necessary conditions for 
knowledge, such as justification or belief. The Paradox of Knowability itself may be 
thought of as a trivial instance of (5), with P(x, !) ! Kx!:  
 
 (5" ) $!(! & !"x(Kx! # Kx!) & ¬$xKx!).  
 
 The argument poses a problem for anti-realists who appeal to intuitionistic logic to block the 
Church-Fitch Paradox. If it is not to be regarded as a reductio of WVER, anti-realists have no 
choice but to deny either (2) or (3). We argue below that neither option seems viable, regardless of 
                                                
6
 We shall consider an alternative definition of an idealised agent in §4. 
whether intuitionistic logic is adopted. The new paradox equally threatens to undermine hierarchical 
approaches to the Paradox of Knowability.
7
 Although the definition of ‘Ix’ involves reference to 
cognitive capacities, it does not involve reference to knowledge of any particular proposition. 
Hence, typing ‘K’ would be uneffective here.
8
 We now turn to some potential concerns about the 
soundness of our proof.  
 
4. Objections and replies  
 
Let us begin with (2), i.e. the claim that there are feasibly unknowable truths. In light of 
the Paradox of Idealisation, anti-realists might reconsider their moderation and argue that 
for any true proposition !, it is possible that ! be known by a non-idealised agent:  
 
 (6) "!(! # !$x(Kx! & ¬Ix)).  
 
Since (6) intuitionistically entails the falsity of (2), our paradox would be blocked. This 
thought might be motivated in different ways. For instance, anti-realists might claim that, 
if there is a method to verify !, then there is a possible world whose space-time structure 
is such that agents with cognitive capacities just like ours know that !. Alternatively, they 
might claim that for any true !, there is a possible world where ! itself, or a proof of it, is 
expressed in a language that renders it cognitively accessible.
9
  
 We do not think that this objection ultimately works. Let s be a description of the 
space-time structure of the actual world or a description of which languages are actually 
used. Now consider the modified premise:  
 
 (2
*
) $!((! & s) & !"x(Kx(! & s) # Ix)).  
 
In perfect analogy with the Paradox of Idealisation, we can argue as follows:  
 
Proof: Assume that (q & s) & ¬$xIx is knowable. Then there is a world w where 
some agent a knows (q & s) & ¬$xIx. This forces w to have the space-time 
structure described by s, or a to speak an actual language. It also follows that ¬$xIx 
is true in w. Therefore, a is a non-idealised knower of q in a world whose space-
time structure is s or where no non-actual language is used. Contradiction, since we 
are assuming that, necessarily, "x(Kx(q & s) # Ix). Thus, (q & s) & ¬$xIx is 
unknowable.  
!  
 Anti-realists might reply by exploiting the characteristic weakness of intuitionistic 
                                                
7
 Thanks to Tim Williamson for pointing this out.  
8
 It might be objected that anti-realists could still block the Paradox of Idealisation by typing the predicate 
‘Ix’. However, it is unclear whether they would have any independent reason for doing so. As Paseau 
(2008) remarks, the main motivation for typing K is to avoid other paradoxes, such as the Paradox of the 
Knower. Yet, no analogous motivation seems to be available in the case of ‘Ix’. Moreover, it is worth 
reminding that merely typing ‘Ix’ will not do:  anti-realists would also need to type any other predicate one 
could substitute in (5).  
9
 We thank Cesare Cozzo and Luca Incurvati for raising this potential concern.  
 
logic. They may deny (7), on the one hand, and express their moderation by claiming that 
not every truth is feasibly knowable, on the other:  
 
 (7) ¬"!(! # !$x(Kx! & ¬ Ix)).  
 
Classically, (7) is inconsistent with the denial of (2), but not intuitionistically. The 
problem with this move, though, is that intuitionists seem to be in a position to prove the 
existence of feasibly unknowable truths. Let q be some decidable yet undecided 
mathematical statement whose decision procedure is feasibly unperformable. Then, q 
satisfies both of the following:  
 
 (8) !"x(Kx q # Ix);  
 (9) !"x(Kx ¬q # Ix).  
 
Since q is ex hypothesi decidable, even the intuitionist should be willing to assert that 
either q or its negation is true. The existence of a feasibly unknowable truth can then be 
easily derived from q % ¬q, (8), and (9).  
 Intuitionists might object that one can never rule out that a sentence that is now 
feasibly unknowable will turn out to be feasibly knowable. However, on the same 
grounds, one would be prevented from asserting empirical generalisations, as Dummett 
himself observes:  
 
there may be some point in saying that, for any statement not known to be false, we 
can never absolutely rule out the possibility that some indirect evidence for its truth 
may turn up; but if we are ever to be credited with knowing the truth of a universal 
empirical statement other than one that follows from scientific laws, this possibility 
may be so remote that we are sometimes entitled to say – as we often do – that it 
will be never be known whether p. (2001: 1)  
 
 Moderate anti-realists might bite the bullet and, instead, deny (3), i.e. the claim that 
there are no idealised agents. But would this be advisable? We see two possibilities, 
depending on how anti-realists define the notion of an idealized agent. If an agent counts 
as idealised just in case her cognitive capacities finitely exceed those of any actual 
epistemic agent, then (3) is indeed an a priori truth. It would say that there are no (actual) 
epistemic agents whose cognitive capacities finitely exceed those of any (actual) 
epistemic agent, which is of course a truism. One might object that, on this reading, the 
claim that there is a decidable proposition satisfying (8) and (9) would be hardly 
acceptable. For how do we know that in the actual world there will never be agents so 
clever that they will be able to decide q? However, the existence of a decidable 
proposition satisfying (8) and (9) is only problematic if one assumes that there is no 
bound to the cognitive capacities of actual epistemic agents. If, as we think plausible, 
there is a bound, then it would seem difficult to maintain that there is no decidable and 
yet feasibly unknowable proposition. On the other hand, anti-realists might take (3) to be 
an empirical claim, for example following Tennant in defining ‘Ix’ in terms of human 
cognitive capacities. The worry would then be that a principle such as WVER, thought to 
be necessary and a priori, would carry a commitment, ¬¬$xIx, that is open to empirical 
refutation.  
 Be that as it may, if anti-realists went as far denying ¬$xIx, this would not help 
them with another variant of our paradox, that rests on the following weaker assumption:  
 
 (10) $!(!(! & ¬$xIx) &"!"x(Kx! # Ix)).  
 
Presumably, even for an anti-realist there is some feasibly unknowable proposition !, 
such that ! and ¬$xIx are compossible. Provided that the relation of accessibility is 
transitive, we can now run a version of the Paradox of Idealisation via (10) and the 
necessitated formulation of WVER:  
 
 (WVER**) !"! (! # !K!).  
 
Anti-realists could reply by rejecting WVER**, thereby sticking to WVER. This, 
however, would be a desperate move: it would leave them with a contingent version of 
their core metaphysical tenet. They might still maintain that WVER is a priori, though 
contingent. But this does not seem to square with the modal profile of WVER as 
supported by the standard anti-realist arguments: semantic anti-realists like Dummett 
would find it problematic to give up the thought that, as a matter of conceptual necessity, 
truth cannot outstrip our capacity to know. Then, provided that the logic of conceptual 
necessity obeys the minimal modal principles required for our proof, the problem would 
still remain. Anti-realists would seem to have only one option left: giving up transitivity. 
But this would be a surprising consequence of accepting WVER**.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The Paradox of Idealisation threatens the viability of intuitionist and hierarchical  
defences of semantic anti-realism. Hierarchical approaches might block the original 
Paradox of Knowability, but fail to block the cognate Paradox of Idealisation.  
As for the appeal to intuitionistic logic, it does not help the anti-realist avoid the 
inconsistency among the three assumptions on which our paradox depends.  
Denying (3) does not seem a viable option, independently of whether classical logic is 
admitted. Rejecting (2), on the other hand, is tantamount to abandoning moderate anti-
realism. Anti-realists who favour either an intuitionist or a hierarchical approach to the 
Paradox of Knowability appear to be confronted with a dilemma: they must either negate 
WVER or give up their moderation. Several other solutions to the paradox have been 
proposed so far.
10
 Although they are all controversial, our result suggests that a more 
promising defense of anti-realism may turn on whether or not they are acceptable. We 
leave to anti-realists the hard task of providing an adequate defence of their metaphysical 
views.
11
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 See, e.g., Edgington (1985), Tennant (1997) and Tennant (forthcoming). 
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